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Carnal, issue 0 of Parterre de Rois
A new magazine in Milandate: 18-07-2013
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Interview with Nicola Toffolini
A worlds inventordate: 24-04-2011
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Donne senza uomini.
Installazione multimediale di Shirin Neshatdate: 01-03-2011
A brief dispatch on water wars over centuries
Where are we at about Agenda 30 goals, Italy included?
This treaty is a framework agreement: it does not replace but complements bilateral or multilateral treaties stipulated for specific aquifers or basins to improve their creation or implementation or subsequent developments.
Initially conceived as a regional treaty for Europe, it was amended in March 2016 and all UN member states can access it. Chad and Senegal became the first African signatories in 2018, Ghana ratified in 2020, followed by Guinea-Bissau and Togo (2021), Cameroon (2022), Nigeria and Gambia (2023). Iraq was the first Middle Eastern nation to ratify in March 2023. Namibia joined in June 2023 as the first South African nation, followed by Panama—the first South American state—a month later (July 2023).
This treaty is very important for Agenda 2030 and its chapters: it directly supports the implementation of Goal 6.5 (nations must implement integrated water management) and Goals 2, 7, 13, 15, 16, 17, and 11.5.
2. The new UN conference on water in 2026 and how far is Italy from the goals of Agenda 2030.
In 1947, the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) established one of the five regional commissions of the international organization, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). It comprises 56 states (including Italy, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel, which has participated since 1991 with temporary status but has been a member of the United Nations since 1949).
The UNECE is perhaps the UN agency that has focused most on water over the last 25 years, coinciding with the exponential increase in conflicts over the new frontier of human rights violations: preventing or brutally cutting off access to drinking water. It is not alone, however, in signing a sort of non-binding Babel of bodies, committees, agencies, and councils on the urgent issue of reducing socioeconomic gaps and improving access to drinking water worldwide.
The Protocol on Water and Health establishes the quantity of drinking water and sanitation that must be equally guaranteed to every citizen. Three critical factors have been identified to ensure this objective: reducing geographical disparities, overcoming the marginalization and vulnerability of certain social groups, and addressing aspects of the problem that are truly addressable given the scale of the territory, resources, and their distribution.
In 2023, the United Nations held the first conference on water in 50 years.
From December 2 to 4, 2026, a new conference will be held, co-hosted by Senegal and the United Arab Emirates, in Dubai, the spectacular island capital.
This event is the last one capable of reversing the dangerous trend of inefficiency for Agenda 2030, particularly regarding water objectives, and will be preceded by a meeting this year in New York. The official languages of the conference will be Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish.
The 2026 conference and its 2025 midterm meeting are perhaps more important than previous events because they come after the United Nations made a significant move, given the lack of results: merging all bodies and agencies dealing with water with a less compartmentalized vision than the current one, giving rise to the UN Broad Strategy for Water and Sanitation.
Among the many stages our country is undergoing in achieving the Goals (from the Millennium to Agenda 2030), we are lagging behind on each of the established objectives. And, rather than establishing water as a public good 'in itself' (in Europe, only Slovenia and Slovakia have included this in the Constitution after numerous successful citizens' battles), according to Agenda 2030, water becomes a commodity purchased at a fair and sustainable price. And who doesn't have the money, even a little, to buy it?
Despite referendums, demonstrations, and other citizen protests, and especially despite the Millennium Goals (Rio de Janeiro Conference, 2000) themselves, and the numerous resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly that have been passed on the issue, especially since 2010.
Relying solely on official data (without considering recent news events that have seen entire regions dry for months in the last year despite enormous sums spent on reservoirs, dams, and aqueduct improvements), from the latest Summer School organized by the ISS (Italian National Institute of Health) and the WHO (World Health Organization), we learn that, with regard to SDG 6.1 (universal access in 2018), 4.2% of the Italian population still does not have access to integrated water services (aqueduct connection) and relies on water drawn from private wells. 10.4% of the population (more than 1 in 10 families) complains of irregularities in the permanent access to drinking water in their homes. Regarding SDG 6.3 (water quality in 2018), one in three Italians declares they do not trust tap water; only 33% of the population enjoys class A and B drinking water (in line with parameters set by the European Union), while 30% of the population is in the lowest quality range. Italians' trust in tap water remains low: in fact, 9 out of 10 Italians consume water in plastic bottles, and our country holds first place in Europe and second place in the world for consumption of bottled water, especially plastic (206 liters per capita per year - Source: ISTAT 2017). Regarding SDG target 6.4 (2018 water management efficiency), the Italian water network is characterized by drinking water losses amounting to 41% of the water introduced into the network. The purification and wastewater treatment systems of 70 Italian cities with populations greater than 15,000 and 30 territorial areas do not comply with the standards established by EU Directives. Since 2018, Italy has paid the Commission €30 million in penalties per semester for failing to upgrade these facilities.
3. Scarcity Means War: The Timeline of Water Wars, the ROIA Case, and Cross-Border River Contracts
The Pacific Institute is a California-based NGO. It has set itself an ambitious goal—to trace water wars around the world on a historical basis—and pursues it with extensive scientific research, extensive collaborations, and doctoral reviews, producing a product whose data visualization is extremely clear and informative, as are the bibliographic sources.
The world (according to the most recent UN studies) will face a 6% drop in national gross domestic product due to water shortages by 2050, which will further encourage forced migration.
It is not just water scarcity that creates tensions that lead to conflict: the trend examined by this independent body is the use of water as a weapon of war.
The Russian-Ukrainian war made us passive spectators of terrible damage to water infrastructure with bombings of dams and aqueducts: in this case, the water caused even more destruction and death than a phosphorus bomb, leaving permanent damage to the territory and survivors, including subsequent scarcity (rebuilding a dam is a task requiring huge resources). Those who were not born during the Kosovo war were perhaps unaware of these military practices, which NATO has systematically applied in Europe and Africa.
Israel is the world power best known for the supremacy of its intrusion and control technology (including software and apps).
Perhaps not many know that it excels in another field: it is the leading net exporter of capillary action, recycling, and rainfall control technologies. These are essential and indispensable technological assets highly valued by Middle Eastern nations that were previously at war with this power and later entered into non-aggression and cooperation agreements, such as the Abraham Accords, the fruit of the diplomacy of the previous Trump administration.
Similarly, Israel recently received the opportunity it had coveted for 50 years: the mission to bomb a sovereign state (Lebanon) in its entirety. Under the pretext of ridding itself of Lebanese supporters following the attack on October 7th, it heavily bombed the entire civilian population unable to flee the country. Above all, it made way for its ground tanks to militarily occupy the area of the Lebanese springs, driving out the UN peacekeeping forces (UNIFIL) with cannon fire and annihilating numerous Lebanese villages and towns in a shocking trail of deaths. The UN contingent is a peacekeeping force composed of soldiers from every nation, positioned precisely at the source of six springs important to the entire region, which Israel has long targeted.
Before the actions that led to the extermination of over 70,000 Palestinians in the so-called Gaza Strip (some independent organizations estimate over 70,000 deaths) and the wounding of over 150,000 innocent people, Israel had been denying Palestinian residents of Gaza access to running water (and electricity) on a daily basis for 12 years, in addition to intensifying air raids at certain times of the year. Gaza is therefore considered the most atrocious open-air concentration camp ever. The large-scale resurgence of polio, typhoid, and hepatitis, along with every other calamity resulting from the total scarcity of hygiene and food, came as no surprise to anyone. Before the invasion of Gaza and its razing to the ground, electricity was allowed for a few hours.
The same thing happens in the West Bank (the other enclave granted to Palestinians after the occupation and confiscation of their lands that lasted from 1917, the year of the Balfour Declaration, to 1967, the last major expansion of the occupation of the Palestinian state by Israeli settlers). One of the objectives of the invasion and destruction of Gaza is the ownership and management of the Palestinian port of the same name, which would complete the closure of the seawater desalination ring that the Jewish state needs to guarantee its precision agriculture. To the detriment of other nations.
In these bloody months of attacks and bombings in Gaza, many observers, including the Water Conflict timeline, have noted the relentless precision with which the IDF (Israeli Defense Force) and settlers have demolished aqueducts and water supplies in the West Bank, to the detriment of Palestinian landowners.
Who has forgotten the oil crises that filled national and international headlines (as well as analysts' desks) in the 1970s? Few in those same years have read about or learned about the many crises, wars, or terrorist acts involving water. Water wars are silenced and mystified until the evidence overflows from the lies.
A few examples: Iraq and Syria fought in 1975, using militias along the borders, over the low flow of the Euphrates River. Conflict was only narrowly avoided, thanks to the mediation of the Arab League.
That same year, South African troops invaded Angola to occupy and defend the Ruacana aquifer and power plant, including the Gove Dam on the Kunene River. The goal, as Water Conflict researchers cite, was to seize and defend the aquifers of Southwest Africa and Namibia.
Beyond being an agent or weapon of conflict, water is often a "hostage" or a byproduct of conflict or protest. In 1978, a reservoir at a water purification company in Japan was contaminated by citizens opposing the construction of an airport. In Mozambique, white government officials intentionally poisoned several wells with the aim of eliminating some Black communities (the bacteriological agent remained a mystery).
Egypt and Ethiopia have always been at war over the Nile River, especially the Blue Nile, which rises in Ethiopia. The latter state planned to build a spring water dam in 1979, and Egypt opposed it, declaring the vital importance of water. Sadat, in particular, declared at the time that "the only thing that could bring Egypt back to war was water." This sentiment was echoed many years later by Boutros Boutros Ghali, who in 1988 declared that the next war in the region could only be over the waters of the Nile, not over politics.
Aside from episodes dating back to the Vikings, it was with Napoleon's conflict against the Russians that water began to be systematically used as a weapon, demolishing dams or flooding canals. Just as fire was used, if necessary, to burn everything they didn't want to let fall into enemy hands. During the Second World War (two episodes, 1940 and 1944), the Finns and Russians mutually used water as a weapon in their conflict. And by the end of World War II, Russia's enemies managed to destroy more than two-thirds of the country's hydraulic systems. The Dnipro Dam in Ukraine was bombed twice (1941 and 1943) by both the Soviets and the Germans. Since the partial invasion of 2014, the Russians have exclusively targeted hydraulic and electrical infrastructure, as they did previously in Moldova with a lightning conflict in 1992 before invading Georgia.
In Asia, things are no better between Russia and China, who have historically disputed several aquifers, and it wouldn't surprise me if agencies quickly focused on triggering incidents on these very waterways with false flag actions.
From the 1960s to the present day, the United Kingdom has been the most present in the timeline of conflicts in Europe, with poisonings or bombings of aquifers by mysterious agents, terrorist and independence groups, or other protesters.
Returning to Italy's borders, there are many creeping conflicts that could arise with water as a "causality or a weapon," whether in the north, east, or west. This government's activism toward the Mussolinian-era Mediterranean "fourth shore" (known as the Mattei Plan) could annoy more than one partner in cross-border river contracts.
Let's take an example where there are already excellent reasons to use water as a weapon.
The current Italian government's diplomatic relations with the French government have cooled, almost to the point of extinction were it not for a personal relationship and aA handful of hastily signed treaties between the presidents of the two Republics (the Italian one does not govern, unlike the French one). In addition to clear political differences and numerous incursions by Italian populist figures favoring internal French causes (from the Yellow Vests to the Lepenists), the greatest disagreements are caused by the management of migrants at the Ventimiglia and Bardonecchia border.
The Roia Valley (Ventimiglia) is Italian to the south and French to the north: a significant portion of Italian territory was part of the compensations under the post-World War II agreement and ceded to France. At the time, many Italians saw the 'rapprochement' with the French as a hope for better living conditions.
This valley is also a river basin of the same name, where a European cross-border agreement between the prefectures and governments of the two EU members is in place: the Eur-Eau-Pa (formerly Eurobassin and Risknet), later renamed Concert Eaux (refinanced in 2017).
If the collaboration were to stop for "exogenous" reasons (not water-related but other crises, such as the highly current migrant transit crisis), over 400,000 citizens would be left without water on each side of the border.
In the event of extreme events (floods and avalanches, which these agreements also address), there would be no unified management. Not to mention the damage to the companies that manage groundwater and surface water resources.
Diana Marrone's essay on CC license can be downloaded at the bottom of this post in the version with full notes



